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SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN: THE BEST KEPT
LEGAL SECRET
I. PREFACE
Our legal system is often characterized in metaphor as a
"living Constitution" and the image of Justice as a maternal
form holding a balance, limited only by blindness, so that she
may proceed through adversity to an objective and pure attain-
ment of the truth.
In general, the trust represented by these images is not mis-
placed. It is a firm conviction that maintains internal order in a
society which is marred externally by a plethora of crime. Our
legal system is exceptional to the extent that it does not exist as
a force separate from the populace it governs, but rather as the
essence of the corporeal body, and as the corporeal form rejuve-
nates itself from lifetime to lifetime, the essence remains and
adapts itself to the demands of each generation.
This traditional relationship presently is being tested by the
modern horror of child sexual abuse,1 the various forms of which
are being reported to police and private and public agencies in
grandiose proportions. The facts of these case histories are
emerging with incomparable ugliness and the urgency for an ad-
equate response cannot be overstated. Unlike the perpetrators of
all other crimes, the child sexual abuser generates the continuing
1. In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115 (1974), which includes the following definition of sexual abuse:
the obscene or pornographic photographing, filming, or depiction of children
for commercial purposes, or the rape, molestation, incest, prostitution, or other
such forms of sexual exploitation of children under circumstances which indicate
that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby, as determined
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
42 U.S.C. § 5104(b)(3)(a). Juvenile offenders are as equally subject to criminal liability
for sex crimes perpetrated against minors as are their adult counterparts. P.G. v. State,
616 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1981).
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existence of his offense.2 Current studies reveal that sexually
abusive behavior toward children creates a psychological legacy,
threading its way like a genetic trait from generation to genera-
tion. An alarming percentage of today's offenders were them-
selves sexually abused as children,- thereby ensuring a commu-
nication of the offense upon future victims not yet born.
The entire spectrum of child abuse, which includes physical
abuse and neglect 4 as well as sexual abuse, extends beyond the
parameters of this note. Therefore, it is limited to the actual dy-
namics and cultural misconceptions relating to child sexual
abuse, inadequacy of current legal procedures to address this
problem, and proposals for innovations that vindicate the rights
of children while ensuring fundamental rights of the accused. 5
2. The masculine pronoun is used in this context based on statistics indicating that
all but a negligible percentage of child sexual abuse crimes are committed by men or
male juvenile offenders. Note, in addition, that father-daughter incest accounts for 75%
of all incest cases reported, followed by brother-sister and uncle-neice incest. Comment,
Incest: The Need to Develop a Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, 22 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 901, 903 (1984) [hereinafter Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse]. In contrast,
however, approximately 60% of all child physical abuse and neglect crimes are purport-
edly committed by women. Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation, A Manual For Judges,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, p. 4 (1981) [hereinafter Child Abuse and
Neglect Litigation]. See also, Finkelhor and Hotaling, Sexual Abuse in the National
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect: An Appraisal, from CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT, (1984), pp. 23-33, which attributes 81% of all child sexual abuse to male
perpetrators.
3. See, Anderson, Sexual Assault Services, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, 130, 137 (1981); A.B.A. NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. FOR CHILD AD-
VOC. AND PROT. INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE CASES (1981) [hereinaf-
ter INNOVATIONS]; see also, A.B.A. NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. FOR CHILD ADVOC. AND
PROT., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD
ABUSE CASES (1982) [hereinafter INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES].
4. Figures and commentators' reports indicate that the problem of physical abuse
and neglect is equally as critical as that of sexual abuse. Comment, The Medical, Legis-
lative, and Legal Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 445, 451 (1978).
Here also, legal and social atrophy deny victims adequate protection. Id. While sexual
abuse ultimately taxes psychological casualties on a society, the manifestations of physi-
cal abuse and neglect produce less speculative logistics. A limited study of sample states
reveals that approximately 25% percent of all child fatalities arising from abuse and
neglect involve cases previously on record with child protective agencies. Besharov, Child
Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, FAM. L.Q., Vol.
XVII, No. 2, 151, 163 (Summer 1983) [hereinafter Besharov, Child Protection].
5. Legal foresight for the benefit of children seems to have focused on protection of
the juvenile offender, by provision of the special juvenile court, the first of its kind in the
world. Libai, Protection of the Child Victim, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1016 (1969) [herein-
after Libai]. On the whole, however, children remain the largest class in the United
States disenfranchised from the legal sanctuary. Miller, Protecting the Rights of Abused
'While the arguments made herein are applicable to child sexual
abuse in general, the formal legal response must be bifurcated to
accommodate the unique aspects of abuse which may be perpe-
trated on the one hand by strangers, and on the other by family
members. In the former instance, laws exist which unduly im-
pede conviction. In the latter, the child victim is betrayed by
both the letter of the law and governmental unwillingness to in-
tervene within the familial province. For those victims, the law
does not remain blindly objective, it merely remains blind.
II. A STATISTICAL FOUNDATION
A. Cases Reported
The acute increase in reports of child sexual abuse is likely
attributable in part to the implementation of general mandatory
reporting statutes.6 Initially, these statutes applied to medical
personnel and imposed a duty to report to legal authorities and/
or child protection agencies cases fitting the profile of the "bat-
tered child syndrome." Additionally, these statutes not infre-
quently levied liability for a failure to report.7 At present, the
varying statutory schemes among the states have brought within
the purview of the reporting obligation not only medical person-
nel, but educational personnel, relatives, social workers' and at-
and Neglected Children, TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 68, 71, (June 1983) [hereinafter Miller]. This
failure to bring children, in particular child victims, within the legal remedial sphere,
guarantees a future penalty to be exacted from the society as a whole. Id. at 70.
6. Besharov, Child Protection, supra note 4, at 153-55.
7. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal Rptr. 69 (1976). Further,
certain jurisdictions permit civil actions against a non-reporting physician and related
defendants for intentional failures to report. See Comment, Civil Action Against Physi-
cian for Failure to Report Cases of Suspected Child Abuse, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 482 (1977).
But see State v. Groff, 86 S.D. 345, 195 N.W.2d 521 (1972), holding that the statute is
not unrestricted. (In Groff, the court refused to convict the physician defendant on the
ground that he had examined and treated the victim's father only, and did not have
knowledge of the victim's condition sufficient to confer obligation).
8. Due in no small part to the recent cases involving systematic sexual abuse prac-
ticed in day care centers and schools, several bills are presently pending in various state
legislatures which would institute centralized agencies for the documentation of all child
abuse and sexual abuse offenders for purposes of day care center and school personnel
reference. These proposed bills have the express approval of the United States Attorney
General. See, ATTY. GEN'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION, RECOMMENDATIONS, Final Report 96-97
(Sept. 1984) [hereinafter ATTY. GEN'S TASK FORCE].
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torneys.' Other states have liberally expanded the definition of
"reporter" and, consequently, the compulsion to report, to any
person having knowledge that abuse has occurred.10 At least 20
states have statutorily abridged the clergy-penitent privilege on
confidential communications between priest and parishioner for
confessions related to the abuse of children, the aged and the
handicapped." In a recent Florida case, a pastor was sentenced
to 60 days for contempt of court in failing to testify with regard
to a confession made to him concerning the sexual abuse of a
six-year old girl." Furthermore, several jurisdictions allow for
actions brought against the passive parent who knowingly or in-
tentionally fails to report and thereby derivately contributes to
child abuse within the family. ' s Current authorities urge uniform
adoption of mandatory reporting statutes, covering actual and
constructive knowledge of abuse, which authorize appropriate
criminal and/or treatment sentences for violations.1
4
As a consequence of the vigorous enforcement of these stat-
utes, the generalized reporting of "abuse" cases has revealed the
more specific occurence of "sexual abuse."' 5 One current study
reveals that perhaps one-third of the female population in the
9. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103 (1974). This broad application of the duty to report is
similar to that practiced in Sweden pursuant to a 1960 revision of relevant statutes
which expanded the duty to anyone "involved in child care." Miller, supra note 5, at 72.
10. Miller, supra note 5, at 72.
11. Ostling, Confidence and the Clergy, TIME, Oct. 1, 1984, at 66.
12. Id.
13. Alaska Stat. § 64.10.010(2)(d) (1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3613(a) (Supp.
1982); Cal. Penal Code § 273(a) (West Supp. 1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1102 (1979);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 2361 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.011(6) (Supp.
1978); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 568.050 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-100 (Supp. 1979); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.21(c)(3) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act. § 1012(e)(III) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-517(1)(c) (Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
1012 (Supp. 1981); Va. Code § 16.1-228(a)(4) (Supp. 1979); W. Va. Code § 49-1-3 (Supp.
1979); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(9) (1978). See generally Bulkley, Analysis of Civil
Child Protection Statutes Dealing with Sexual Abuse, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE
LAW, 81-88 (A.B.A. Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. for Child Advoc. and Prot. (5th ed. 1984),
[hereinafter CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW] for a comprehensive breakdown of the
application, breadth and nature of reporting and protection statutes and their enforce-
ment in criminal and family courts among the states.
14. INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 28.
15. A recent state survey conducted by the National Committee for Prevention of
Child Abuse, The Size of the Child Abuse Problem, (Working Paper February 1985),
shows 43 states reporting increases in sexual abuse cases. Reporting states indicate in-
creases ranging from 10% (California) to 126% (Mississippi).
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United States experienced some form of sexual abuse as a
child,"6 with approximately 100,000 new cases being reported an-
nually. 17 Yet another study deems this a conservative figure and
estimates that irrespective of cases reported, the actual occur-
rence of this form of child abuse is more likely in the area of
hundreds of thousands of cases each year, of which instances of
parent or parent surrogate abuse constitute a substantial pro-
portion. 18 The familial proximity of the abuser to the abused
prevents specificity in the determination of number and identity
of victims. Incest, the most intimate form of child sexual abuse,
is commonly unreported. Sexual abuse practiced by a non-family
abuser is still often perpetrated by non-strangers, related by af-
filiation if not consanguinity." Even among cases involving the
stranger offender, a common occurrence is that parents refrain
from notifying authorities for reasons ranging from embarrass-
ment to the desire to avoid further trauma to the victim through
the protracted legal process. The operative result of non-report-
ing dynamics of child abuse is that an estimated mere 10% of all
cases involving female victims under 12 years old are reported to
police.20 One commentator has predicted that incest occurs to-
day at the rate of one in every twenty American families.21
B. Sexual Exploitation
In examining sexual abuse outside of the family, it is impor-
tant to note supplementally the extent of sexual exploitation of
16. Landis, Experience of 500 Children with Adult Sexual Deviation, 30 PSYCH. Q.
Supp. 91 (1956).
17. Child Sexual Abuse: Incest, Assault and Sexual Exploitation, National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, at 2 (April
1981).
18. An estimated 75% percent of all incest cases involve father-daughter relations.
Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 903.
19. One illustrative sample from a Washington, D.C. hospital's Special Assault Unit
indicates that almost 18% of the offenders were parents or parent-surrogates; over 18%
were other relatives; and nearly 47% percent of the remaining assailants were known to
their victims. Stranger assailants constituted less than 16%. Lloyd, Corroboration of
Sexual Victimization of Children, CHILD SExuAL ABUSE AND THE LAW supra note 13, at
122, n.88 [hereinafter Lloyd, Corroboration].
20. Libai, supra note 5, at 1016, n.134.
21. Comment, Characterization of the Daughter as an Accomplice in Incent Prose-
cutions: Does Texas Immunize the Father?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1983) [herein-
after Daughter as Accomplice].
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minors, that is, sexual abuse characterized by commercial ex-
ploitation of sexual activity. National reports indicate that be-
tween January 1976 and June 1977, approximately 300,000 mi-
nors were sexually exploited, 2  alternatively and concurrently,
through commercial film, magazine and sex ring enterprises, the
gross profits of which aggregate between one-half to one billion
dollars annually.23 The prototype sexually exploited minor is
psychologically and/or physically ignored by his parents, an un-
derachiever at school and suffers from poor sociological develop-
ment.24 Out of this familial vacuum the child is drawn, some-
times irretrievably, into this underground industry in exchange
for money, gifts and often, the attention they lack at home.2 5
C. Actual Court Actions
The paucity of court actions related to child sexual abuse
reflects the difficulty of accurately reporting its occurrence. It is
estimated that only 24% of all cases nationwide result in crimi-
nal action.2 More importantly, this figure diminishes drastically
as the cases advance through the legal process. A corrolation can
be drawn between the body to whom the act is reported and the
number of reports that ultimately reach the courtroom. Reports
made to police result in court actions nearly half the time; re-
ports to public agencies proceed only one in four; and reports
made to private agencies are actively pursued in the courts at a
22. CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, A.B.A. Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. for Child Advoc.
and Prot. 1, n.7 (Rev. Ed. 1984) [hereinafter CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION]. These victims
are generally garnished from the societal fringes of homeless runaways or from families
having little supervisory and emotional cohesion. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Child Sexual Abuse, Legal Issues and Approaches, Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. For
Child Advoc. and Prot. 3-4 (August 1981).
25. Id. at 4. See also Hammer, A Missing Boy Returns After a Strange Odyssey,
PEOPLE MAG., February 3, 1984, at 34-36. This article discussed the disappearance of
Bobby Smith and return to his family after 21 months of apparently willing companion-
ship with his accused molester, whom together they passed off as Smith's father during
the near 2-year haitus. Preliminary reports indicated that Smith was sexually molested,
but otherwise cared for by the accused, and despite repeated opportunities to flee, Smith
willingly remained in order to receive gifts such as video game toys. Smith's teachers
revealed that he maintained a relationship with the accused for some time prior to his
"abduction", and that his parents did little to discourage the relationship.
26. Finkelhor, Removing the Child-Prosecuting the Offender in Cases of Sexual
Abuse: Evidence from the National Reporting System for Child Abuse and Neglect, 7
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 195, 202 (1983) [hereinafter Finkelhor, Removing the Child].
[Vol. III
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rate of a mere four percent.27
Incest cases, by virtue of the relationship between the per-
petrator and victim, create unique impediments to successful
prosecution, even after the difficulties of detection have been
overcome. Conditions vitiating successful prosecution include:
social skepticism about the reliability of accusations made by
children; a general categorization of pedophilia as a mental dis-
order, rather than a criminal offense, better addressed under
sexual psychopathy proceedings than criminal actions; present
procedural systems that, absent creative and equitable reform,
further traumatize the youthful victim; and reluctance on the
part of prosecutors to pursue cases which rely in the main on the
content and stability of a child's testimony.2"
In addition, detection and apprehension of commercial ex-
ploitation offenders are rare due to the clandestine nature of the
ventures, the secrecy of the market and internalization of manu-
facture and distribution.2 9
The exact reporting and adjudication of sexual abuse cases
is uniquely disabled by acquiescence to the activity common to
families in which incest occurs. Incestual abuse is perpetrated
nearly exclusively, upon both male and female children, by male
parents or parent surrogates within the family unit.30 Conse-
quently, the abuser indulges his sexual proclivities from a posi-
tion of economic and emotional power, thereby immunizing him-
self from legal reproach."1 Fundamental to all forms of child
27. Id. at 203.
28. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assaust, 40 J.
OF Soc. ISSUES 125, 126-27 (1984) [hereinafter The Testimony of the Child Victim]. See
also Wulkan & Bulkley, General Survey Findings Relating to Prosecutorial Practices
and Policies, INNOVATIONS, supra note 3, at 3:
The most frequent reason cited for not prosecuting an intra-family case was
incompetency of the child witness, that is, the child was too young or forgot
specific dates and places. A second reason listed was the lack of corroboration.
While very few jurisdictions will require corroboration in child sex cases, it ap-
pears that most prosecutors still seem reluctant to prosecute such cases without
evidence in addition to the children's testimony. (emphasis in the original).
29. CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 22, at 1.
30. See generally Finkelhor & Russel, How Much Child Sexual Abuse is Committed
by Women (Nov., 1983) D. Finkelhor, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH
(1984).
31. Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 609, n.4
(1983) [hereinafter Tort Remedies], reporting a study of 250 police reports of child sex-
ual abuse in New York, of which only nine percent of the offenders received prison
1986]
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abuse is what one commentator has termed "the greatest power
differential, 32 the subjugation of the most subordinate actor in
a family unit (or variation thereon) by the most dominant. This
symbiotic relationship between the offender and victim requires
the prosecuting attorney to combine roles as legal professional
and strategic tactician in the face of the victim who recants,3
and in one recent case has resulted in the prosecution impeach-
ing its own witness-in-chief.3' The sexual proxy of daughter for
mother is premised upon the obsequious, yet physically remote
relationship of mother to father. The typical, though not exclu-
sive, profile of a mother within a family where incest occurs is
that of a woman physically expended by multiple births, who
gradually delegates her maternal and spousal obligations to an
accommodating and obedient child, culminating with a bequest
of her sexual involvement as well. Apprehensive of losing the fi-
nancial and operative support of her husband, she chooses
sentences. The high attrition rate of cases proceeding through the legal system prior to
trial is attributed to the dominance of father-offenders who are able to circumvent crimi-
nal redress through the psychological and emotional duress inflicted upon the victim in
the home setting. An initial step to compensate for the seemingly insurmountable advan-
tage the incest-offender maintains at home is the gradual elimination of the child/parent
privilege. In a recent California case, the alleged victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by
her physician step-father was sentenced for civil contempt for refusing to testify. San
Francisco Examiner, Jan. 8, 1984 at 1, col. 4. See also Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied, Keefe v. Massa-
chusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984) (the court compelled the testimony of three minors in the
highly publicized murder of Robin Benedict for which their father stood accused). Com-
ment, Evidence- Privileges-Compulsion of Child to Testify Against Parent, 69 MASS. L.
REV. 103 (1984).
32. Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CUR-
RENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH (1983).
33. Pressure brought to bear upon the victim at home combined with internal guilt
and responsibility for incarceration of the abusive parent, often results in a retraction of
all prior allegations. Berliner, Blick and Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of
Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, 166, 172 [herein-
after Expert Testimony]; CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, supra note 13; Goodman,
The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Research and Legal Prac-
tice, 40 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 157, 165 (1984) [hereinafter The Child Witness] ("[Clhildren
not infrequently rescind their reports of sexual assault due to intimidation and guilt,
even when the reports are true.").
34. Peckinpaugh v. State, 447 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1983) (state offered into evidence
prior inconsistent statements of two purported victims of incestuous molestation, aged
11 and 16, who at trial denied allegations made against their father in sworn statements
to police). Curry, Tactics When The Child Molestation Victim is a Poor Witness, 8 J. oF
Juv. L. 255, 257-58 (1984).
[Vol. III
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neither to risk confrontation nor force an ultimatum. 5 The em-
phasis on financial considerations, however, should not mislead
the reader into assuming that incest is a malady peculiar to eco-
nomically depressed families. 6 While the rate of occurrence is
purportedly higher in lower income families, incest is a secret
31
nurtured just as carefully among the rich as the poor. 8
III. PROFILES
A. The Abuser
Contrary to social stereotype, the attack of a child sexual
abuser is rarely occasioned by extreme physical violence. Rather,
the pedophile seeks domination through enticement, encourage-
ment or instruction, and may resort to threats, intimidation or
physical coercion only when faced with a recalcitrant victim.3 9
Generally, the attack stops short of penetration, and consists
predominantly of passive, non-assertive conduct such as petting,
35. This acquiescence manifests itself also at trial when the passive parent chooses to
invoke a marital privilege rather than testify against her spouse. In response, nearly
every jurisdiction has judicially adopted an exception to the marital privilege in cases
involving the physical abuse, neglect or sexual manipulation of a child of either spouse.
See, e.g., State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 949 (1964).
See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1980).
36. Although poorer families are disproportionately represented in child abuse
figures, this is principally attributable to the fact that families in this economic strata
are disproportionately monitored by public agencies in relation to higher income fami-
lies. Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation, supra note 2, at 4. Note, however, that while
sexual abuse of boys occurs more frequently in lower-income families, and physical abuse
of sons by mothers is more prevalent in black families, sexual exploitation by fathers of
their daughters is a disproportionately white, middle-and upper-class phenomenon.
Finkelhor, Sexual Abuse of Boys: The Available Data (Nov. 1981) (unpublished manu-
script) [hereinafter Finkelhor, Sexual Abuse of Boys].
37. Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 611, n.9. "Secrecy is an essential element of
incestuous abuse." Id.
38. E.g., the California case involving an aerospace engineer found guilty of repeat-
edly molesting his four daughters between the ages of 8 and 17, for a period of nearly ten
years, and the sensational trial of St. Louis millionaire, Mark Molasky, who forced his
wife, prior to their marriage, to perform sexual acts with a three year old boy which he
simultaneously filmed for the purpose of blackmailing her into accepting his matrimonial
proposals. Miller, supra note 5, at 68-69. In contrast to general physical abuse, sexual
abuse of children is particularly concentrated among the middle-class. Finkelhor, Sexual
Abuse of Boys, supra note 36.
39. Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse
Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1745, 1750 (1983) [hereinafter Child Hearsay Statements]. See
CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 22, at 3.
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exhibitionism, fondling, and oral copulation. 0
Similarly erroneous are preconceptions of the pedophile as
an older man,4' latently or actively homosexual, and prone to
alcohol or drug abuse. Studies show that the typical pedophile
committed his first offense while still an adolescent, that in
many instances the pedophile is married, predisposed toward
heterosexuality and perhaps an abuser of his own children, and
that his attacks are the product of systematic, compulsive be-
havior and not erratic impulses released while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs.4 2 Unfortunately, psychiatric rehabilita-
tion is generally unsuccessful, although some positive results
have been achieved through hormone therapy. 3
The incestuous offender is also susceptible to a degree of
classification. While usually introverted and insecure outside his
home,4 the incestuous father is aggressive and domineering
within its confines and tends to keep his household inextricably
isolated from the outside world. Psychological research indicates
that the incestuous abuser often suffers from poor impulse con-
trol, deep-seated feelings of inadequacy, low self-esteem and in-
ability to maintain gratifying interpersonal relationships, symp-
toms which would naturally subside where the intimate partner
is so vastly subordinate to the principal in age, maturity and
personal, emotional and psychological development. 5 Incest
most often occurs in intensely patriarchal families, 6 where the
male authority figure may actually think himself entitled to ob-
tain sexual gratification from all sources within his family. Often
he is prone to alcohol abuse and may physically abuse other
members of the family, although physical violence rarely accom-
panies the sexual assault.'7 The incestuous abuser rarely com-
40. CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 22, at 3.
41. The median age of men who commit sexual offenses against children is 31, al-
though a significant percentage of that group is under 20. BASIc FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL
CHILD ABUSE (1982) (distributed by The National Committee for Prevention of Child
Abuse, 332 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1250, Chicago, Ill. 60604-4357).
42. CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 22, at 3.
43. Magnuson, Private Violence, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, 20-21.
44. "Although they are acts of the strong against the weak, they seem to be carried
out by abusers to compensate for their perceived lack of or loss of power." Common
Features of Child Abuse, supra at note 32.
45. Expert Testimony, supra note 33, at 172.
46. Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 611-12.
47. Daughter as Accomplice, supra note 21, at 1136.
450 [Vol. III
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mences the pattern of abuse with actual intercourse but instead
with gentle touching and fondling that gradually, over a period
of time,"8 progresses to oral copulation, abstaining from inter-
course until after the victim reaches puberty. The victim's
postpubescent situation is marked by intense domination and
constant surveillance, often made worse by the perpetrator's an-
ger when the victim begins to show interest in boys and dating.
Frequently, this postpubescent oppression results in the victim
running away from or leaving home at an early age, or marrying
young in order to leave. The pattern of the incestuous abuser,
however, is cyclical, and should younger daughters remain at
home, he is likely to repeat the same pattern upon them.49
B. The Passive Parent of the Incestuous Menage
Conversely, mothers in families where incest occurs are pas-
sive and characterized by low self-esteem. Such a mother has
often borne several children, rejects her husband sexually, and
may suffer bouts of alcoholism or suffer from emotional distur-
bances.50 Many were themselves victims of sexual, physical, or
emotional abuse as children.5' The progressive sequence of nur-
turing interchangeable roles within the family fosters the daugh-
ter's role as sexual surrogate.5" In stark contrast to the shroud of
secrecy that shields incest from the outside world, within the
home incest is generally a known component of the familial in-
frastructure. Thus, acquiescence is an identifying characteristic
of the incestuous family, represented by the mother who per-
ceives no choice other than to submit to the pattern of role re-
versal she herself helped to architect. It is documented that as
the rate of aggressive maternal objection rises, the instance of
incest decreases. 53 Maternal passivity is the sine qua non of in-
48. The average time span of incestuous relationships is at least three years, and
often as long as five to seven years. Daughter as Accomplice, supra note 21, at 1137.
49. Id. at 1136-37; Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 904. See
also Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of Scientific Author-
ity in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 235, 248, n.45 (1983)
[hereinafter A Question of Credibility).
50. Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 613.
51. BASIC FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE, supra note 41.
52. Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 907. See also supra
text accompanying note 32.
53. Herman and Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, 2 SIGNS: J. WOMEN, CULTURE
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cestuous abuse within the home.5 ' It is important to note that
while maternal acquiescence is a sine qua non factor, it is not
the sole nor dominant factor essential to incest. Acquiescence by
its very definition denotes a "yielding" and insinuates an "un-
willing accord." The choice to accept father-daughter incest is
often the product of what is perceived to be the total absence of
any other alternative. It often reflects the dilemma of a non-par-
ticipant father, several children and a mother financially unable
to survive and provide for her children without the aid of her
husband.55
C. The Abused
The absence of violence in pedophiliac attacks is not sur-
prising since a child's natural curiosity, naivety, and compla-
cence in relation to authoritarian adult figures, and vulnerability
to promises of reward make him/her a cooperative victim.56 The
innocence is characteristic of the pre-attack victim. The immedi-
ate after-effects of the attack, however, include mental trauma,
disturbed sleeping patterns, bedwetting, loss of appetite, loss of
patience and frequent temper tantrums, a rapid manifestation of
introverted behavior and difficulty in learning activities due to
poor concentration and a shortened attention span.5 7 Long-term
effects are unique to each child, and may not emerge for a pro-
tracted period of time, but authorities note that promiscuity and
prostitution are common, as well as a characteristic predisposi-
tion to engage in sexually abusive relationships later in life."
AND Soc'y, 735, 746 (1977); Burgess, Holstrum and McCausland, Divided Loyalty in In-
cest Cases, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 115-16 (1978).
54. Daughter as Accomplice, supra note 21, at 1135-36.
55. Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 613-14, n.31. There are instances, however,
where disbelief is dominant when incest enters the family sphere. In these instances, the
fear of family dissolution, apprehension of independency, and hesitation to force a con-
frontation renders more attractive the option merely to sustain marital loyalty and be-
lieve that the victim is lying. INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 18; Ex-
pert Testimony, supra note 33, at 177; Haley v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 150, 247 S.W.2d
400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
56. Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1750, n.50.
57. A MESSAGE To PARENTS ABOUT: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, (distributed by The Child
Sexual Abuse Victim Assistance Project, Children's Hospital National Medical Center,
111 Michigan Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20010).
58. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or a Perpetra-
tor?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643, 650, and n.41 (1982).
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Caught between the paradoxical father-mother profiles in
incestuous homes, is the child victim. Immediate effects on the
victim are shame, anguish and frustration arising from the de-
sire for maternal intervention that never occurs.59 The short and
long-term effects reported by various studies include anxiety;
pseudo-seductive behavior;60 alienation and antisocial, escapist
behavior, perhaps resulting in drug and alcohol abuse; sexual fri-
gidity and dysfunction; 61 homosexuality,62 neurasthenia;63 and
various forms of psychosis including schizophrenia, depression
and suicidal obsession.
6 4
IV. STATUTORY AND COURTROOM ASPECTS OF PROSECUTING
CHILD ABUSE CASES.
A. Competency to Testify
While present laws among the individual states differ as to
the threshold point below which a child6" is deemed automati-
cally incompetent to testify, the general rule treats competency
as a question of law, 6 within the discretion of the court,67 predi-
59. Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, supra note 32, at 20, citing Her-
man and Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, supra note 53.
60. Psuedo-seductive behavior is not a psychological aberration, but rather the
learned behavioral by-product of acting out in public, that which produces loving re-
sponses from the parent-abuser, and is thus more common among younger victims. This
behavior may include unzipping men's pants, exhibitionism, and mock-adult seductive
mannerisms. Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse supra note 2, at 905, 916 n.107.
61. Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 616.
62. Finkelhor, Long Term Effects of Childhood Sexual Victimization In a Non-
Clinical Sample (Oct. 2, 1980) (unpublished manuscript).
63. Neurasthenia is "[n]eurosis manifested chiefly by exhaustion, mental and physi-
cal fatigue, irritability and poorly localized symptoms without any underlying physical
disorder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 939 (5th ed. 1979).
64. See generally Finkelhor, Long-Term Effects of Childhood Sexual Victimization
in a Non-Clinical Sample (1980) (unpublished manuscript); Daughter as Accomplice,
supra note 21, at 1132-34; Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 908;
Expert Testimony, supra note 33.
65. 4 years old-State v. Thrasher, 233 Kan. 1016, 666 P.2d 772 (1983); 3 years
old-Kelluem v. State, 396 A.2d 166 (Del. 1978).
66. Smith v. U.S., 414 A.2d 1189, 1198 (D.C. 1980).
67. Id. at 1197. Note that in Smith, the court permitted prosecution counsel to par-
ticipate in voir dire, id. at 1198, but excluded defense counsel participation. The higher
court, while acknowledging that competency of minor witnesses is within the sole discre-
tion of the court, ruled that the biased slant of the voir dire occasioned by prosecutorial
involvement resulted in a constitutional violation of the accused's right to cross-examina-
tion. This abridgement during voir dire is not unqualified, and will not automatically
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cated usually upon a voir dire of the child victim/witness con-
ducted exclusively by the court. Through voir dire, the trial
judge elicits responses indicating whether the child witness dem-
onstrates levels of veracity, 8 intelligence, 9 memory70 and verbal
communication sufficient to protect the interests of the accused
against false testimony.71 Furthermore, voir dire permits the
court an opportunity to observe the witness under questioning.
Thus the demeanor of the witness 72 becomes an intangible but
vital element in the balance between the state's entitlement to
the best evidence probative on the facts and the accused's right
to a just and fair trial.7 Satisfaction of these elements, however,
determines only admissibility and the court is free to give the
jury instruction as to the weight to be accorded such testi-
mony.74 Cautionary instruction, however, will not cure an inade-
quate examination into the competency of a minor to testify.
The trial judge is at all times under the responsibility to reach a
determination only after a comprehensive evaluation of all ele-
ments fundamental to the inclusion of testimony against an ac-
cused. The accused is further entitled to challenge the finding of
the court on appeal, and reversible error will be found upon a
showing of discretionary abuse at the trial level.75
validate reversal where the witness adjudged competent gives testimony which is merely
cumulative, id. at 1199, or where the opportunity to cross-examine during the testimony-
in-chief is deemed satisfactory for constitutional purposes. See INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE
CASES, supra note 3, at 30; Jackson v. Beto, 388 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1968).
68. A present understanding of the difference between truth and falsity, as well as
comprehension of the obligation equivalent to an oath to speak the truth. See Melton,
Bulkley and Wulkan, Competency of Children as Witnesses, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND
THE LAW, 125, 127 (1984) A.B.A. Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. for Child Advoc. and Prot.
[hereinafter Children as Witnesses].
69. The mental capability of the witness at the time of the occurrence(s) to retain
accurate recall thereof. Id.
70. Sufficient to independently recollect the event(s). Id.
71. The ability to verbally communicate in the courtroom the recollection of the
event(s). Id.
72. Id. at 131; INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 31.
73. This voir dire procedure is analogous to that performed on potential witnesses
assumed to be non compos mentis by reason of mental retardation or otherwise. People
v. Freshly, 87 A.D.2d 104, 451 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); People v. Johnson, 30
Mich. App. 284, 186 N.W.2d 94 (1971); People v. LaPorte, 103 Mich. App. 444 (1981).
74. Children as Witnesses, supra note 68, at 131.
75. Id. See also State v. Manlove, 79 N.M. 189, 191, 441 P.2d 229, 231 (1986).
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B. Misconceptions About the Ability of Children to Testify
Accurately and Without Fabrication
At all stages of any criminal trial dependent upon the testi-
mony presented by a child victim/witness, the substantive and
procedural aspects of the law are additionally encumbered by in-
fluential factors less malleable to judicial management. In par-
ticular, the strong undercurrent of doubt concerning the ability
of the minor to be a lucid and factual witness has created a vor-
tex into which the objective disposition of the crime is precari-
ously swept. Among these centrifugal concepts are beliefs that
children are predisposed to false allegations, unable to separate
real occurence from mental fantasy, and acutely susceptible to
leading questions.76 Wigmore, legal history's most revered acade-
mician of the law of evidence, went so far as to recommend the
psychiatric examination of all female claimants alleging sexual
misconduct on the grounds that these claimants in particular are
prone to bring charges based on fantasy, psychosis or self-serv-
ing motives such as revenge or bribery.77
Modern research, relying on realistic simulation of the judi-
cial demands of eyewitness and identity witness testimony,
rather than unsubstantiated theories based on antiquated bias,
has produced results which almost totally controvert the validity
76.
A provocative illustration that the issue of children's testimony is complex was
provided by Allport and Postman (1947) in The Psychology of Rumor. Adults
who viewed a picture of a subway scene often erroneously reported that a black
man was holding a razor, and holding it aggressively, when, in fact, a white man
held the razor in the scene. Children, if they recalled this detail, never confused
who was holding the razor. Freud (citation omitted) suggested that the "untrust-
worthiness of the assertions of children is due to the predominance of their im-
agination, just as the untrustworthiness of the assertions of grown-up people is
due to the predominance of their prejudices." At this time, it remains unclear
whether the imagination of children or the prejudice of adults is the more dan-
gerous enemy of justice.
Johnson and Foley, Differentiating Fact From Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's
Memory, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs, 33, 46 (1984) [hereinafter Fact From Fantasy].
77. 3A J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, 924-a. "No judge should
ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history
and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician." A
more searching examination into Wigmore's treatise regarding the competency of classes
of witnesses reveals an appalling misogynist bent to his views. For exhaustive analysis
into the underlying theories of Wigmore's interpretation of legal doctrine, see A Ques-
tion of Credibility, supra note 49, at 235.
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of these conceptions.7 8 At the outset, medical research indicates
that the power of recall and narrative communication is correla-
tive to the cognitive capacities of the narrator. Therefore, it is
unlikely, if not impossible, that a child witness would be able to
repeat with any degree of consistency a detailed account of an
imagined past sexual assault, insofar as their cognitive knowl-
edge of explicit, sophisticated sex acts would not be developed to
that extent."* Further, it appears that children have qualified
but accurate memory capacities for the identification of adult
faces.80
In regard to a child's power to distinguish actual happenings
from what may have been imagined to have happened, research
indicates that while a minor below 8 is often unable to separate
his own acts from his conscious thoughts of acting, 6-year olds
performed equally with adults in distinguishing between the acts
of others and what they were told to imagine others to be do-
ing.81 More importantly, false accusations by children of sexual
abuse appear to be the exception and not the rule.82 A five-year
research program instituted by a Michigan police department
using polygraph examinations of child claimants registered a
false allegation rate of less than 1% . Other statistics show that
the rate of false reports for sexual offenses is generally parallel
with that of other crimes.
8
4
Concurrently, children's memory recall of acts with which
they are familiar sometimes exceeds that of adults.86 Therefore,
78. The Testimony of the Child Victim, supra note 28, at 127. There exists no scien-
tific basis upon which the theory that children usually make false accusations of sexual
assault. In fact, high rates of admission by offenders are testimony to the general verac-
ity and reliability of child claimants.
79. The Child Witness, supra note 33, at 162; Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19,
at 105.
80. Chance and Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's
Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. op Soc. IssuEs 69, 71 (1984) [hereinafter Face-Recognition
Memory].
81. The Child Witness, supra note 33, at 161; Fact From Fantasy, supra note 76, at
42, 45.
82. Sylas, Would A Kid Lie, 71 A.B.A. J. 17 (1985).
83. Children as Witnesses, supra note 68, at 136. The program was implemented
from 1969 through 1974 and yielded only one irregular polygraph out of 147 taken.
84. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 104.
85. Fact From Fantasy, supra note 76, at 35; Goleman, Studies of Children as Wit-
nesses Find Surprising Accuracy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1984, C1, col. 1 [hereinafter Stud-
ies of Children as Witnesses].
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the victim of a pattern of incest induced over a period of time
could be expected to possess recollective powers exceeding that
legally required for testimonial competency. In addition, several
short-term and a few long-term studies show that loss of infor-
mation over differing time intervals does not increase apprecia-
bly with decreases in the age of study subjects."8
The singular quality peculiar to child testimony arises with
the actual giving of testimony before a court. This aspect is
characterized by children's responses to leading questions, the
literal nature of children's language and response in testifying,
and the effect of live confrontation on the courtroom testimony
of children. Several studies show that children, in exhibiting the
subordinate behavior to adult authoritarian figures that makes
them, ab initio, a passive target for sexual abuse, respond affirm-
atively to leading questions. In addition to submissiveness on
the stand, children are more likely to be led on questions involv-
ing subjects with which they are unfamiliar. They are thus easily
confused by defense counsel and, in their discomfort, may an-
swer affirmatively in a search for approval. 7
Courts are urged to exercise a constant awareness to the lit-
eral nature of child testimony, as well as language cues, in order
to differentiate between what appear to be inconsistent state-
ments from the natural translation of children's thought
processes into verbal reenactment.88 Otherwise, seemingly self-
contradictory statements may be confused for what are, in actu-
ality, the unshaking literal recollection of events from the mem-
ory of the victim. Language cues are likewise illuminating in the
anlaysis of child testimony. Self-generated thoughts, as opposed
to real happenings, are usually described in terms of what the
child was thinking at the time of the purported "occurrence."
Conversely, actual occurences are usually stored in the children's
memories in the context of their sensory, rather than mental,
reactions. Therefore, verbal recollection of actual events will
86. Fact From Fantasy, supra note 76, at 36.
87. Id. at 37.
88. For instance, in one case a child witness/victim had sworn prior to trial that his
abuser took him to an apartment. When questioned on the stand whether or not the man
took him to his house, the witness answered in the negative. It was not until after trial
that what appeared to be an inconsistent statement was actually a negative response to
whether or not the child had been taken to a "house" since he remembered being taken
to an "apartment." Studies of Children as Witnesses, supra note 85, at C4, col. 6.
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likely be described using spatial, temporal and sensory terms.8 9
Finally, like adults, accuracy in testimony is adversely af-
fected by stress upon the child witness. As with adults, though
not to as great an extent, questions from authority figures calcu-
lated to confuse the witness with the implication he or she is not
telling the truth will produce stress on the stand. More particu-
larly, while testing accuracy among the different methods of
identification-black and white photographic identification,
color photograph identification, one-way mirror line-up and live
confrontation-optimum results were achieved through one-way
mirror line-up when the witness had been assured that the sub-
jects were not able to see the identifier. However, the same sce-
nario reenacted with live confrontation produced marginal re-
sults, leading to the conclusion that live confrontation produces
stress which results in the least probative and least accurate tes-
timony on the stand. 0 This "inverted-U" relationship 9' presents
a strong argument for excepting face-to-face confrontation of
victims and defendants in child sexual abuse cases.2
C. Jury Bias
Arguments against procedural reform in the adjudication of
child abuse and sexual abuse cases often include the conclusory
assumption that juries are emotionally empathetic to the ex-
ploitation and manipulation of child victims. It is posited that
this emotional predisposition taints the credibility of the de-
fendant from the outset and colors an objective disposition of
his case by jurors, thereby awarding the victim a distinct advan-
tage at trial. Statistics show, however, that conviction rates for
sexual offenses are substantially lower than that for other
crimes.' 3 In cases involving child victims, research data indicates
that if any jury bias does exist prior to the presentation of evi-
dence, it is indeed adverse to the victim."'
89. Fact From Fantasy, supra note 76, at 39.
90. Face-Recognition Memory, supra note 80, at 81.
91. Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex Offense
Proceedings, CHILD SEXUAL ABusE AND THE LAW, A.B.A. Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. For
Child Advoc. and Prot. A.B.A. 184, 189 (5th ed. 1981).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 121-133.
93. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 104.
94. Goodman, Golding and Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witness, 40 J. OF Soc.
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There seems to have been little or no research conducted to
determine the reasons why prospective jurors are hesitant to
hand down criminal convictions based upon the testimony of a
child witness. Therefore, it is at best only a presumption that
the foregoing section dealing with misconceptions concerning the
veracity and reliability of child testimony provides any plausible
explanation. Findings do exist, however, to show that among a
non-clinical sampling of prospective jurors and classes of profes-
sionals, less than 50% of any one group confirmed a belief in the
accuracy of child testimony, and prospective jurors in general re-
sponded 69% against a presumption of accuracy.9 5
Inquiry into the factors affecting jurors' evaluation of wit-
nesses in general reveals that trustworthiness, consistency, cer-
tainty, confidence and objectivity are the criteria by which credi-
bility is measured.96 This does not imply that each factor carries
equal weight, but in the areas of consistency and confidence,
child witnesses are, by nature of their tender years, at a disad-
vantage.97 As noted above, slight nuances in the presentation of
questions may produce varying verbal communications from a
child witness even though the mental picture of the occurence is
left intact. Self-contradiction is often fatal to the weight a jury
places on testimonial evidence, regardless of the source. Confi-
dence may also be undermined by the stress produced by face-
to-face confrontation with the alleged abuser at trial. Studies in-
dicate that the form of response is also vital to the trust a juror
will place in testimony, favoring a running narrative over short,
succinct answers that may appear to be rehearsed." In this re-
spect, children are again disadvantaged since questioning is
likely to be restricted to short-form responses.9
Assuming the above to be indicative of jurors in general, it
appears that the triers of fact receive testimonial evidence in a
way which unduly discriminates against child witnesses. The re-
ceipt of evidence, however, constitutes only the preliminary obli-
gation of jurors. In summary, they are compelled to conduct de-
ISSUES, 134, 137 (1984) (hereinafter Jurors' Reactions].
95. Id. at 142.
96. Id. at 144.
97. Id.




liberations directed toward arriving at a verdict based upon an
objective weighing of all evidence presented at trial. Research
data indicates that the flow of adverse jury bias seeps into jury
deliberations, impairing the strength of child testimony and its
capacity to sustain a verdict. These findings show that jurors
place more weight on defendant testimopiy and circumstantial
evidence, if any, in the disposition of cases where the state's
case-in-chief consisted primarily of a child victim's statements.
Less emphasis is placed on these additional sources of evidence
where the case-in-chief is built upon the testimony of an adult
witness. 100 In short, absent corroborative evidence supporting a
child's testimony, juror bias weighs against conviction. Charac-
teristic of child sexual abuse and, in particular, incest, is the fre-
quent lack or total absence of corroborative evidence. Under a
legal system created, implemented and enforced by adults, the
failure to provide for equitable modifications that compensate
for imbalances created by the youth factor renders such a sys-
tem ineffective for the child victim.
D. Corroboration Statutes
The element's of New York's corroboration statute are pro-
totypical of legislation which inadvertently operates as a disad-
vantage, if not virtual barrier, to successful prosecution of child
sexual abusers on behalf of the victim.
A person shall not be convicted of consensual sodomy, or
an attempt to commit the same, or of any offense defined
in this article of which lack of consent is an element but
results solely from incapacity to consent because of the
alleged victim's age . . . unsupported by other evidence
tending to: (a) Establish that an attempt was made to
engage the alleged victim in sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, or sexual contact, as the case may be,
at the time of the alleged occurrence; and (b) Connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense or at-
tempted offense.10'
The requirement of corroboration, like the misconceptions
100. Id. at 151.
101. N.Y. Penal Law § 130.16 (McKinney 1974).
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surrounding the competency, accuracy and veracity of child wit-
nesses, is based upon assumptions that may have had some basis
in antiquity, but which have no viable support from modern sci-
entific and medical data.1'0 Assuming, arguendo, that the bur-
den of defending a sex offense charge is disproportionately oner-
ous upon the defendant, the absence of a parallel statute for the
crimes of threat, minor assault, attempted bribery, obstruction
of justice and disorderly conduct is puzzling insofar as these
crimes are just as easily charged and just as difficult to de-
fend.103 In light of the data produced above, no cogent rationali-
zation exists for strict application of the corroboration require-
ment as a permissible safeguard on behalf of the defendant in
sex crime cases involving child victims. New York's corrobora-
tion statute cited above is illustrative of the standard form uti-
lized by states retaining such laws. Such statutes are often ap-
plied in conjunction with accomplice statutes which presume the
victim to be an accomplice to an act characterized by the ab-
sence of force, threat of bodily harm or duress, and by the fail-
ure of the alleged victim to make a prompt report or
complaint.1
0 4
If an argument can be made as to the wisdom of theories
postulated in support of such statutes, a more vigorous dispute
can be taken with their application. Specifically applied to a
case of incest, the practical effect would be to render a daughter-
victim's testimony inadequate to return a conviction, notwith-
standing that the last occurrence of abuse may have been dis-
tant enough in time so that corroborative medical evidence is
unavailable, and notwithstanding that incestuous abuse is rarely
accompanied by force, thereby foreclosing the possibility of
physical evidence. '5 Statements made to teachers, acquaint-
ances or relatives of the victim may be found inadmissible as
out-of-court statements constituting impermissible hearsay.
Even assuming the existence of a statutory or judicial exception
to the marital privilege rule applicable to sexual abuse cases, so-
cial studies and profiles prove it unlikely that, absent the cer-
tainty of conviction of the accused, and subsequent liability of
'102. See INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 48.
103. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 105.
104. See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
105. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 112.
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the passive parent, a mother capable of giving corroboration tes-
timony will step forward.106 Ironically, in those cases involving
stranger rather than intrafamily sexual abuse, the presence of a
corroboration statute is merely pro forma, since these cases, un-
like incest, are usually rapidly reported, thereby facilitating pro-
duction of both physical and medical evidence, and even the ad-
mission of out-of-court statements made by the victim to others
under an "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rules.
107
E. Accomplice Statutes
Several new penal statutes include a corroboration re-
quirement for the incest offense. Texas law, however, has
long recognized that the consenting partner to incest is
an accomplice witness whose uncorroborated testimony is
insufficient to convict.0'
In the abstract, accomplice statutes appear to require no
more than the law is entitled to demand. A finding of prior
"consent" by an accuser to the acts or elements constituting any
crime logically detracts from any outrage or violation claimed to
have been suffered. It follows as a matter of course that where
prior consent is present, the coupling of such a statute to an-
other requiring corroboration works no undue infringement
upon the rights of the alleged victim. However innocuous these
evidentiary rules may appear in the abstract, their operative ef-
fect within the context of incest cases is often fatal to the pur-
106. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45; Response to Intra-Family Sexual
Abuse, supra note 18, at 912 & n.76. Several states have recognized the unsuitability of
corroboration and/or accomplice statutes to cases of incest and have judicially overruled
them for purposes of this particular form of child sexual abuse. See, e.g., Baker v. Geor-
gia, 245 Ga. 657, 266 S.E.2d 477 (1980); State v. Hesse, 281 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1979); In
re Lawson, 273 S.C. 560, 257 S.E.2d 745 (1979); and State v. Goff, 86 S.D. 345, 195
N.W.2d 521 (1972). Yet other states have qualified their corroboration statutes to en-
force the requirement only upon an impeachment of the accusing witness' testimony or a
showing that the testimonial evidence is contradictory, inconvincing or inherently unbe-
lievable, e.g., Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Wulkan & Bulkley, Analysis of Incest Statutes
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, A.B.A. Nat'l Legal Resource Ctr. for Child Advoc.
and Prot. at 64 n.45 [hereinafter Analysis of Incest Statutes].
107. For a complete discussion of hearsay statements in the context of sexual abuse
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 135-54.
108. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (Vernon 1974).
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suit of valid claims.
Statutory classification of an incest victim as an accomplice
is disqualified, ab initio, by reason of the judicial presumption
that minors cannot "consent" to sexual activity. 09 In addition,
there is unquestioned authority for the proposition that, absent
a principal's adoption or authorization of an accomplice's state-
ments, admission of such statements into evidence violates con-
stitutional due process. 110 Hypothetically then, if someone other
than the victim, pursuant to mandatory reporting statutes,
alerted police to an incest offense, any statement made by the
victim, now characterized as an accomplice, would be inadmissi-
ble prior to its affirmation by the accused. This is tantamount to
requiring a guilty plea or confession in order to be able to pre-
sent a case-in-chief at trial.
Courts have constructively found "consent" based upon a
mere absence of physical force"' duress or undue influence," 2
threats of physical violence,"' or failure to promptly report the
offense. 1 4  Furthermore, in connection with any alleged
"threats," apprehension on the part of the abused, and the
abuser's capacity to enforce such threats, must be proven. Such
an evidentiary burden is unduly onerous upon the claimant and
wholly unresponsive to the myriad subtleties of the incest of-
fense which command meticulous judicial sensitivity.
As previously noted, the pattern of incestuous abuse rarely
entails physical trauma to the victim." 5 Rather, the methodol-
109. People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 875 n.5, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718, 724 n.5 (1970);
State v. Borne, 224 N.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975);
Komurke v. State, 562 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Analysis of Incest Stat-
utes, supra note 106, at 59.
110. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 98 (1970), Justice Blackmun in his concurrence
stated: "Alternatively, I would be prepared to hold as a matter of due process that a
confession of an accomplice resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be intro-
duced as evidence of the guilt of an accused, absent, some circumstances indicating au-
thorization or adoption." Id. (Blackmun J., concurring).
111. Tindall v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 153, 43 S.W.2d 1101 (1931).
112. Bolin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
113. Id.
114. Masten v. State, 100 Tex. Crim. 30, 34, 271 S.W. 920, 922 (1924) (regardless of
fact that defendant threatened to kill accused and her family if she reported fact that
relations continued until pregnancy gave rise to inference of complicity); Mercer v. State,
17 Tex. App. 452 (1885) (failure of victim to cry out even though others were within
hearing range cast her as an accomplice).
115. Supra text accompanying notes 42 and 99. See also, Daughter as Accomplice,
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ogy is to offer inducements likely to attract and entice the
youthful victim, such as gifts, attention and favored
treatment."'6
Court-made law requiring prompt reporting of sexual abuse
discounts the importance of why minor victims remain silent. In
this regard, the law rigidly imposes an adult standard without
compensating for the cognitive and emotional difficulties chil-
dren experience as the victims of adult crimes.
Commonly, reports of sexual abuse by children are made
only, if ever, after a lengthy time interval. 11 7 Studies approxi-
mate that among adults currently reporting sexual abuse as chil-
dren, between 67%-75% had never reported the assault
before." '1 Experts in the field report that an inverse relationship
exists between delay of report and the victim-abuser relation-
ship; as the familiarity among victim and abuser increases, the
likelihood of reporting decreases. Consanguinity among the vic-
tim and abuser produces the least reported cases."19
Commentators cite fear of being blamed for the relation-
ship, 2 ° fear of punishment and rejection, 21 fear of being ac-
cused of lying, 22 feelings of confusion and guilt, 123 and threats of
the abuser, 24 as militating against swift and accurate reporting
by victim.
1 25
Judicial exception from accomplice statutes of compliance
by duress or undue influence merely pays lip service in the ab-
sence of a clear and adequate definition of those terms. Most
jurisdictions applying the statute have declined to equate the
power of parental dominion and intimidation with either
exception.2 "
supra note 21, at 1135-37.
116. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 112.
117. Expert Testimony, supra note 33, at 174 (citing transcript of expert testimony
by Lucy Berliner in State v. Doyle, Slip. No. 80-1-03135-6 (Super. Ct. Wash., Dec. 19,
1980)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 176.
120. Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 906.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1757.
124. Id.
125. See also Expert Testimony, supra note 33, at 171.
126. Cf. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942). The Richardson
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The lack of clear guidelines delineating duress and undue
influence has produced and will sustain inconsistent results
among jurisdictions. An understanding of intrafamily dynamics,
and the characteristics unique to families within which incestu-
ous abuse is fostered, should assuage legal ambivalence toward
alleviating antiquated evidentiary burdens. The incestuous par-
ent practices the most insidious form of duress. Incest occurs
where familial love, trust, and admiration have coalesced with
manipulation, advantage and self-gratification. When parental
influence is exercised to coerce sexual subjugation, it is an exer-
cise of "undue" influence.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED Vs. LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THE VICTIM: STRIKING A BALANCE
A. The Right of Confrontation
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.'2 As pointed out to me by a colleague, the Constitu-
tion gives a right of confrontation, not intimidation.12 8
Within the procedural, emotional and regimentary arena of
the criminal law process, victims are often the most manipulated
and least willing of its subjects. Their participation has been en-
listed, in effect, by proxy-the fatalistic and irrational kismet of
having been singled out as a target by the offender. Subse-
quently, the target becomes the tool with which the legal ma-
case involved prosecution of an abusing father under the forcible rape statute, rather
than the incest statute, and therefore the victim's out-of-court complaint of rape state-
ments were sought to be admitted solely for the purpose of negating the affirmative de-
fense of consent. Case law involving child/victims below the statutory age had held that
the admissibility issue was moot, since even willing minors are incapable of consenting.
Nonetheless, the Richardson court ruled that it would admit such statements into evi-
dence where additional, corroborative evidence existed showing the act to have been
committed by use of force. While the issue approximates that confronted in accomplice
statute cases, the Richardson decision is fundamental insofar as it recognized that force
could be exerted "under the compulsion of long continued parental duress." 349 Mo. at
1111, 163 S.W.2d at 960-61. See also Daughter as Accomplice, supra note 21, at 1143,
1153.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This federal right was deemed held applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
128. Response to Intra-Family Sexual Abuse, supra note 2, at 924 n.137.
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chinery of the state, on its own behalf, seeks to obtain retribu-
tion. Thus, the intimate suffering of the victim is transmitted
into the social debt of the convicted offender.129 When the vic-
tim is a child, trauma suffered by reason of the pre-trial process
compounds the psychological harm and may even exacerbate the
mental and emotional injuries derivative of the actual abuse.13 0
This pre-trial stress is further and perhaps primarily aggravated
in court as a result of direct confrontation with the accused. The
crowded courtroom, imbued with a high degree of anonymity,
places the child witness in an unfamiliar environment, in which
the accused stands apart as a startling reference point to a grim
recollection. The natural consequence is trauma to the minor
victim,131 particularly when the offender is a prior acquaintance
or relative, 1 2 which is more often the case than not. 3
Still, courts have ruled that in the absence of proof to the
effect that an adverse psychological impact will ensue as a result
129. The paradox between exclusivity of suffering and societal mutuality in vindica-
tion further disrupts a child victim's ability to comprehend his/her own blamelessness. A
principal at the time of the offense, but subordinated to evidentiary conduit at trial, the
child victim may feel that society has likewise homogenized the offense across the public.
As a result, child victims do not feel as though justice has intervened on their behalf.
A few unique cases and several authorities now stand for the proposition that, in
sexual abuse cases involving children, civil actions should be instituted on behalf of the
victim in order to assess tort damages for the physical and/or psychological damage suf-
fered, e.g., Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (awarding $42,000 to defendant-
molestor's step-daughter, of which $30,000 was deemed punitive damages); X. v. Melder,
3 Civil 20125 (on appeal from the Superior Court, Butte Cty., California) awarding sexu-
ally abused daughter nearly $1 million (cited in Tort Remedies, supra note 31, at 617
n.55, 618 n.58).
130. "Frequently, abused children suffer additional harm from the justice sys-
tem. . . . The most disturbing example is the practice in some jurisdictions of repeated
interrogation of the child. In many cases, children are subjected to over a dozen grueling
and detailed investigative interviews." ATTY. GEN'S TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 15. Cf.,
Sweden's employment of special female investigators who are both qualified police-
women and trained nurses. In addition, Swedish law permits the recordation of inter-
views on tape for future use in lieu of repeated interrogation of the victim. Miller, supra
note 5, at 72 (citing Nat'l Ctr. on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Dept. of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REP. 2 (1979)).
131. "One study of a random sample of child sex victims compared the emotional
condition of those who participated in judicial proceedings with those that did not and
found that children who went to court showed more psychic harm." Parker, supra note
58, at 649.
132. Id. at 646. Psychic trauma is more profound in child witnesses testifying against
prior acquaintance or relative defendants than when testifying against a stranger.
133. Id. In 75% of cases involving child victim-witnesses to sex crimes, the offender
was known to the child.
1986] NOTE
of testifying, a defendant's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion, which guarantees cross-examination by the defense, and
speaks to production of the witness before the jury for inclusion
of demeanor evidence into the assessment of credibility, may not
be compromised. '3
The covetous immunity reserved to confrontation by the
Constitution is related to the abhorence of the evil sought to be
cured by its institution, namely, the imported practice of trial by
ex parte affidavit. 3 5 This form of "legal" proceeding effectively
removed any obligation of the state to prove its case. Often evi-
dence was coerced or merely fabricated. Conviction was obtained
by judicial fiat and unbridled infringements on the integrity of
the legal process. The continued vitality of Star Chamber tactics
134. Matter of S Children, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007, 102 Misc.2d 1015, 1019 (1980)
(child custody hearing for termination of visiting rights in which respondent-father was
accused of sexually molesting his 3-year old son in the presence of a second son, age 6;
the elder son refused to testify in presence of father and all motions to secret respondent
during child's testimony were denied on confrontation grounds); and Herbert v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 664, 669, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 853 (1981) (seating arrangement in
courtroom whereby defendant could hear, but not see, 5-year old victim-witness during
testimony regarding her alleged molestation violated defendant's right of confrontation,
interpreting the right as specifically "face-to-face" meeting of accused and witnesses in
the courtroom). The Herbert court placed great emphasis on the ability of a defendant
to look upon, and be seen by, the witness. Does this mean that blind witnesses automati-
cally abridge the sixth amendment by reason of their incapacity to see the defendant?
Cf. State v. Gallon, 115 Wis.2d 592; 340 N.W.2d 912, 913 (1983), finding that adult rape
victim was "unavailable" for courtroom testimony purposes by reason of severe, medi-
cally confirmed, mental illness which would be aggravated by courtroom appearance. In
Gallon, the witness was, at the time of trial, diagnosed as mentally disturbed. This is
distinguishable, however, from the latent mental effects visited upon child victims of
sexual abuse. Even if courts were to recognize an exception from live testimony for vic-
tims presently affected by severe psychic disturbance, the exception would prove fatally
narrow. In light of the long gestation of abuse-derivative illness, such an exception would
serve only those witnesses so obviously affected so as to place doubt on whether they
could, in any event, meet competency requirements.
135. Accusation by ex parte affidavit, a historical means of instituting proceeding
throughout seventeenth century Europe, generally used an anonymous complaint de-
clared at court, supported by allegations of absent, anonymous witnesses, and, fre-
quently, the obstruction of defense efforts to call rebuttal evidence and witnesses. They
were commonly referred to as "Star Chamber" trials. The pervasive contamination of
bias at every level of these proceedings rendered presentation of a defense merely illu-
sory, see, Libai, supra note 5, at 1023; Baker, The Right of Confrontation, The Hearsay
Rules, and Due Process- A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in
Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529, 548 (1974) [hereinafter Confrontation and Due
Process]; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 180 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-
95 (1970).
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would compel a strict and literal application of the right of con-
frontation. However, that argument loses much of its import
given the panoply of objective safeguards that characterize our
modern criminal trial system. The right of confrontation is an
enhancement and not a singular bastion of defense entitlements.
It shares its purifying influence with, inter alia, the right to a
public trial, the right to call witnesses and testify in one's own
behalf, the right to compel production of evidence and the right
to trial by a jury of one's peers. Hence, the right of confronta-
tion, as a contributory, and not solitary, guarantee of a defend-
ant's interests, is not an inert declaration, but one capable of
assimilation into a broader chemistry of interests, including
those of a victim-witness.'3 6
Inflexible application of broad guarantees which are open to
varying interpretation, 87 at the expense of psychic injury to the
minor witness, produces equally undesirable side-effects on the
validity of the judicial process. 38 The marginal quality of child
136. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1895):
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to pre-
vent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross- examination of the witness. . . . But
general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and value
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and
the necessities of the case. . . . The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of
the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may
be preserved to the accused. (emphasis added).
137. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970). "Regardless of the interpretation one
puts on the words of the Confrontation Clause, the clause is simply not well designed for
taking into account the numerous factors that must be weighted in passing on the appro-
priateness of rules of evidence." No argument is implied that confrontation is or should
be construed as anything less than a fixed guarantee to defendants in criminal proceed-
ings. In light of the values sought to be protected, however, and the amorphous nature of
the language in which it is cast, the sixth amendment is susceptible to influences arising
from the exigencies of the case. There is no constitutional edict which explictly states
that confrontation is to be construed in a physical sense. The interests of the criminal
defendant, in proceedings which affect personal liberty, are arguably satisfied in the op-
eration of judicial confrontation. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
138. "The stress is intensified if the victim must face the accused again, or if he or
she must testify against a close relative, a situation that often occurs in sex abuse cases.
Under these circumstances, children, if they reply at all, often give confused and inaccu-
rate answers." Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1752. Children are generally
not required to testify at child custody cases because the purpose of the proceeding is to
protect the child's best interests and such hearings are assumed to be unusually stressful
for child witnesses. It would be anomalous for the judiciary to unduly inflict what it has
been called upon to prevent. Weighed against protection of the defendant, however,
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testimony elicited under the duress of in-court, live, adversarial
conditions injects impurity into the presumption of a utopian
attainment of evidence thought to arise automatically upon sat-
isfaction of the sixth amendment. Compassion is not the opera-
tive factor. In a system devised, dispensed and enforced by
adults, the practical implications of compelling minors to testify
expose the minor victim-witness as a class disadvantaged by sta-
tus-the immutable characteristics of immaturity and non-
sophistication.
This note is not intended to argue for a blanket rule ex-
empting from legal obligation all child claimants, s5 but between
the freshly recognized interests of the youthful victim and the
time honored rights of alleged offenders lies the legal fissure
that, unnegotiated, continues to either conceal or discount fun-
damental evidence. 14 0 Using established doctrines of evidence
and innovative theory as collateral, it is possible to purchase the
validity of one interest without bankrupting the value of the
other.
courts refuse to enforce this same standard in criminal cases. Sinner, Children As Wit-
nesses, monograph available by writing to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Jus-
tice Assistance, Research and Statistics, Washington, D.C. 20531. See also State v. Gil-
bert, 109 Wis.2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982) (criminal court denied a request of the state
to waive personal in-court testimony of child witness over psychiatric evidence warning
against production of the witness because of expected resulting psychic injury).
139.
Psychiatric opinions and studies emphasize that each child victim reacts to an
offense and its aftermath in his own individual way. . . . Thus, there can be no
more justification for excusing all victims from testifying than for imposing the
duty on all of them. Each case merits its own individual decision.
Libai, supra note 5, at 1009.
140.
The logic of the proceeding discussion might suggest that no testimony be re-
ceived unless in full compliance with the three ideal conditions [cross-examina-
tion, taking of oath and opportunity to have demeanor examined by the jury].
No one advocates this position. Common sense tells that much evidence which is
not given under the three conditions may be inherently superior to much that is.
Moreover, when the choice is between evidence which is less than best and no
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing
without. The problem thus resolves itself into effecting a sensible accommoda-
tion between these conditions and the desirability of giving testimony under
ideal conditions.
Confrontation and Due Process, supra note 135, at 542, n.46 (citing PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem, 56 F.R.E. 198, 289
(1972)).
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B. The Hearsay Counterweight
Right of confrontation contentions have been entered with
equal vigor against evidence arising from outside the courtroom.
Prosecutors, seeking to circumvent confrontation obstacles to
untraditional sources of testimony in the courtroom, have most
frequently resorted to the hearsay doctrine in an attempt to sub-
mit prior out-of-court statements by the victim in lieu of live
production at trial.14 1 Hearsay presumes the "unavailability" of
the declarant, and permits, upon a showing of trustworthiness,
reliability and necessity, submission into evidence of prior out-
of-court statements. Judicial determinations on hearsay focus, in
the main, on whether the above elements applied to such state-
ments render their submission consistent with the contours of
the sixth amendment's protective sphere. 2 Insofar as face-to-
face confrontation is a moot issue in hearsay analysis, and de-
meanor and examination evidence are thus lacking, need, trust-
worthiness and reliability are emphasized to compensate the
natural dimunition of the defendant's interests arising from the
declarant's absence at trial. Moreover, hearsay statements will
not be admitted if it appears that the accused would thereby be
denied a reasonable opportunity to respond with rebuttal evi-
dence. Inability to rebut will not act as an automatic bar so long
as the unfettered opportunity to do so has been secured.
14 3
Approval and utilization of hearsay, in any event, forecloses
the presumption of the confrontation clause as absolute. Al-
though hearsay may appear to represent, in disguise, the con-
frontation clause as applied to extrajudicial statements, the two
doctrines are not mutually inclusive. 14 Hearsay rules constitute
141. Hearsay is generally defined as an out of court statement offered at trial, by a
witness not the original declarant, to prove the truth of the matter asserted. But see
People v. Taylor, 66 Mich. App. 456, 461, 239 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1976) (admissible only as
corroborative evidence); People v. Kreiner, 329 N.W.2d 716, 717, (Sup. Ct. Mich. 1982)
(holding that insofar as tender years exception developed by courts had not been codi-
fied in recent adoption of state's rules of evidence, it could only be used for the purpose
of corroborative evidence and not to bring in out of court statements as part of the case
in chief).
142. The disposition of hearsay statements is neither frivilous nor arbitrary. Laxity in
application of any one element of the hearsay principles conjures regression into trial by
ex parte affidavit. That concept is equally as offensive to the hearsay doctrine as it is to
the confrontation clause. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-95 (1970).
143. Note, Right to Confrontation, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 748 (1965).
144. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970):
[Vol. III
19861 NOTE 471
an adaptive mutation where an otherwise pivotal link'45 in the
confrontational progression-cross-examination-is missing.
146
As a compensatory measure, meticulous and overbearing legal
scrutiny is required in order that the substitutional utility of the
hearsay exception does not exhault convenience over fundamen-
tal fairness to an accused. The objective of the hearsay doctrine
is neither to capitalize on situational contingencies nor to short-
change constitutional guarantees. The object is to recover other-
wise irretrievable probative evidence, provided adequate likeli-
hood of essential trustworthiness and necessity have been estab-
lished.147 Thus, the substance of the confrontation clause is
preserved in the event academic conditions cannot be met.
Hearsay doctrine does not countenance "material departure
from the general rule.'
48
Of the various forms of hearsay exception, the "excited ut-
terance" or "res gestae," and "declaration of present bodily feel-
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the confrontation
clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the confrontation clause is
nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their excep-
tions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never estab-
lished such a congruence; indeed we have more than once found a violation of
confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under
an arguably recognized hearsay exception. (citations omitted). The converse is
equally true; merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-estab-
lished hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
rights have been denied.
145. Cross-examination, of which demeanor is a component, has been described as
the indispensable element of confrontation. Comment, A Not Very Clear Say on Hear-
say, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366, n.4 (1966).
146. "The right of confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the wit-
ness." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); accord Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 101
(1970).
147.
Both the right to confrontation and the hearsay rule reflect the belief that some
evidence which might be of probative value should not be admitted unless the
declarant has actually appeared in court and has been cross-examined with re-
gard to his sincerity, memory, perception, and ability to communicate ...
courts have admitted hearsay in criminal trials. . . within one of the established
common-law hearsay exceptions which have developed because of a notion of
potential trustworthiness, or because of necessity. However, the purpose of the
common-law exceptions appears to be to facilitate the admission of probative
evidence.
Right to Confrontaton, supra note 143, at 747.
148. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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ings, symptoms and conditions" rules have been most often used
in regard to the out-of-court statements of children. 149 "Declara-
tions of present bodily feelings" include statements given to
medical personnel who receive information relating to the occur-
rence in the course of administering examination and treatment.
Because treatment of a complaint or illness is involved, the law
presumes also the accuracy of the statements made.150
More often, declarations by children are advanced as "res
gestae" or "excited utterance" statements, arising from and di-
rectly related to a shocking or startling event and communicated
spontaneously or so contemporaneously thereafter as to preclude
the inference that such statements could be the product of re-
flection or fabrication. 5' In addition, the res gestae exception
does not preliminarily require "unavailability" of the declar-
149. "Complaint of rape," though not a hearsay exception per se, is sometimes used
in a similar manner, as corroborative evidence to negate any allegation of consent. Gen-
erally, it is unavailable for purposes of our facts since the issue of "consent" is presump-
tively moot when the victim is a minor.
150. See, Buckley, Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of- Court
Statements of Sex Abuse at Trial, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 153, 157 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter Evidentiary Theories]. See also FED. R. EvID. 803(2). Rule 803(1), the
present sense impression exception, covers statements made during the occurrence or
immediately afterwards. This may facilitate the admission of statements of witness-sib-
lings whose utterances made contemporaneously with, or temporally immediate to,
events of incestuous abuse may be entered into evidence at trial regardless of the compe-
tency of the declarant to testify.
151. FED. R. EvID. 803(4). In effect, the statements are categorized as part of the
transaction itself.
The fact that the prosecutrix was not more definite or explicit in her state-
ments and in the identifying of her assailant tends strongly to disprove the idea
that what she said was the result of thought or premeditation, but to the con-
trary, demonstrates that what she said was the act of speaking through her...
Williams v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 536, 170 S.W.2d 482, 490 (1943). Res gestae is
composed of simultaneous exclamations and verbal acts. Spontaneous exclamations gen-
erally explain the event. Verbal acts are statements accompanying and forming an inte-
gral part of the transaction, without which the event would lack legal effect, e.g., in
states retaining an accomplice/corroboration statutory scheme, the protestations of a
sexual abuse victim would be the verbal acts quotient of the event negating consent. In
the former sense, the statements arise from the transaction, while in the latter, they form
a component thereof. Courts have used both theories in order to bring out-of-court state-
ments within the purview of the exception. See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1368, 1371
§ 2 (1962). See also State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 247 A.2d 313, cert. denied 395 U.S.
924 (1965); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1368, Later Case Service, § 11 (1979), which admitted
into evidence under the res gestae exception, the physical actions of deaf-mute rape vic-
tim, which acts were construed to identify her assailant.
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ant."5 2 Further, several courts, in conceding the non-sophistica-
tion of minor victims, and the psychological influences that mili-
tate against prompt reporting, have liberally construed the
breadth of a startling occurrence, and hence the temporal pa-
rameter which is the essential element of the rule, according to a
so-called "tender years" exception."'s A blanket rule for auto-
matically excusing all child witnesses from testifying would
therefore result in a violation of the hearsay doctrine and of the
right of an accused to call his accuser before the court. The
court-created "tender years" exception requires an ad hoc, case
by case analysis of factors such as age of the declarant, nature of
the claim asserted, relationship between the accused and the vic-
tim, as well as facts dispositive of the spontaneity and trustwor-
thiness of the statements made. 54 It is not fatal to the applica-
tion of the exception either that the statements were made in
response to a question or, peculiar to cases involving victims of
tender years, that the statements were not temporally proximate
152. Evidentiary Theories, supra note 150, at 155.
153. The decisions further state that when the declarant is a young child, the impact
of an event forestalls reflection for longer periods than is the case with adults. Therefore,
longer time intervals may pass without subjecting the defendant to accusations produced
from calculated fabrication. See State v. Padilla, 110 Wisc.2d 414, 419, 329 N.W.2d 263,
266 (Wisc. App. 1982) (permitting testimony of victim's mother as to statements made 3
days after the event and testimony of juvenile officers as to statements made even later,
on the theory that the interval used against children must be measured by duration of
the excitement and not time); State ex rel Harris v. Schmidt, 69 Wis.2d 668, 230 N.W.2d
890 (1975) (in which victim's statements to mother 1 day after assault and to probation
officer 15 days later were both admitted into evidence); People v. Gage, 62 Mich. 271, 28
N.W. 8 (1866) (time lapse of 3 months between assault and statements by victim to
others, statements admitted as "res gestae" declarations); Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis.2d
702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971) (statements made to mother 1 day later); U.S. v. Nick, 604
F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979) (admitting statements of 3 year-old made some hours
later to mother under Rule 803(2) and subsequent statements to examining physician
under Rule 803(4); State v. McFall, 75 S.D. 630, 71 N.W.2d 299 (1955) (statements made
2 weeks later deemed to be admissible under res gestae exception); State v. Broody, 96
Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964).
154.
Each case must be viewed on its particular facts and exercising its discretion of
whether to admit testimony about statements made by a child . . . [T]he court
should consider the age of the child, the nature of the assault, physical evidence
of such assault, relationship of the child to the defendant, contemporaneity and
spontaneity of the assertions in relation to the alleged assault, reliability of the
assertions themselves, and the reliability of the testifying witness.
Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis.2d 702, -, 184 N.W.2d 867, 870 (1971). See also Child
Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1758.
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to the assault. 55
More importantly, courts have admitted such statements
into evidence regardless of whether the declarant could be
deemed, either by reason of age'56 or physical disability' 7 in-
competent to personally testify at trial.""8 Even assuming that
admission of the out-of-court statements is in violation of either
hearsay or confrontation principles, if they merely represent cu-
mulative evidence, the error will be deemed harmless error and
the trial court's verdict will not be disturbed.'5
It is possible, however, that another argument exists in sup-
port of admission at trial of a victim's hearsay statements by a
witness other than the declarant. This proposition virtually
treats the statements as something other than hearsay, removing
the need for analysis of court-made exceptions and the restric-
tions attendant thereto. By way of example, if the out-of-court
declarations may be fixed as verbal acts, integrated into the en-
tirety of the event, then the witness at trial, at the time of hear-
ing such declarations, is, in effect, witnessing part of the event
first-hand. If the actus of the assault may be said to attach to
and continue with the statements, then the witness at trial is
converted into a direct witness-party and, on the stand, is simul-
taneously witness and declarant.' 60
155. U.S. v. Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir. 1980); People v. Miller, 58 Ill. App. 3d
_, 373 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (1978); Bertrang v. State, 50 Wisc.2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867, 870
(1971); State v. Broody, 96 Ariz. 259, -, 394 P.2d 196, 200 (1964). See also Hale v. State,
164 Tex. Crim. 482, 300 S.W.2d 75 (1957) (statements made to grandmother); Holmes v.
State, 165 Tex. Crim. 200, 305 S.W.2d 588 (1957) (to female parking attendant); Wilder
v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 255, 333 S.W.2d 367 (1960) (to policeman); State v. Withrow,
142 W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913 (1957) (to teacher); People v. Woodward, 21 Mich. App.
549, 175 N.W.2d 842 (1977) (to policewoman).
156. Annotation, Declarant's Age as Affecting Admissibility as Res Gestae, 83
A.L.R.2d 1368 (1962).
157. See State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 247 A.2d 313, cert. denied 395 U.S. 924
(1965).
158. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The common thread of reasoning
cited as justifying the admission of statements made out-of-court by a declarant of
tender years is that the prior knowledge of minors regarding sexual matters is not so
developed as to make it probable such statements are self-serving allegations derived
from fabrication or connivance, and that delays in reporting, in light of the nature of the
offense and the immaturity of the victim, are understandably the product of influence
relevant to determination of the reliability of statement by minors. See also Child Hear-
say Statements, supra note 39, at 1751.
159. U.S. v. Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980).
160. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 88:
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C. Proposals for a Fair and Equitable Compromise.
In the continuing tension between the rights of accused and
victim, the child victim introduces a factual ele-
ment-age-which impacts upon rules of procedure and evi-
dence at every level. The greatest obstacle to advocates of re-
form for the benefit of child victims is the confrontation clause,
and various, perhaps excessively, innovative modifications have
been urged upon the courts and legislatures. The argument for a
tender years exception based on res gestae principles is conven-
ient insofar as "availability" of the declarant is not an issue
upon which the exception depends. Therefore, the confrontation
clause is circumvented, and at the pre-codification stage, a
tender years exception presents an attractive alternative. How-
ever, this embryonic stage is enhanced by the freedom to con-
duct a thorough, case-by-case analysis which may not occur in
the face of a codified rule requiring mechanical application.
This note supports the theory that confrontation does not
entitle an accused to face-to-face confrontation with a victim,
particularly in the instance of youthful victims where the poten-
tial of intimidation is too great.161 However, the production of
witnesses at trial and the asset of demeanor evidence incident
thereto, is meant to facilitate the jury's task in the synthesis of
evidence. Personal appearance at trial only derivatively benefits
the defendant when witness demeanor diminishes the weight of
the evidence .1 2 Further, cross-examination is a right held in
The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying as to what he
has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial
statements. From the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under
oath, subject to cross- examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the
trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only as to what he has seen but also as to
what he has heard.
161. See Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1983), wherein in the court permit-
ted substitution of a witness' live testimony by inclusion into the record of his out-of-
court statements, on grounds of witness intimidation. The court rejected defendant's
confrontation clause contentions on the theory that but for the intimidation occasioned
by defendant himself, live testimony would have been possible. The capacity of an ac-
cused to intimidate a child victim-witness, particularly when a familial relationship ex-
ists between them, is sufficient cause to demand the avoidance of a face-to-face
encounter.
162.
Part of this effective cross-examination is the opportunity to compel the witness
"to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
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trust and exercised on behalf of the defendant-beneficiary by his
attorney and not by the accused himself.' 63
This interpretation of the confrontation clause is in accor-
dance with the application of hearsay rules. A federal codifica-
tion of the tender years exception 1" ' would be excessive in light
of the constitutional criteria it acts to avoid. If contoured along
the same lines as now-existing state regulations, 165 it would leave
unanswered the issue of legally excusing production of the vic-
tim face-to-face with the defendant at trial, since present stat-
utes accommodate corroborative evidence only when the declar-
ant is unavailable. To utilize the exception solely for the purpose
of corroborative evidence does nothing to change the status of
incompetents and victims who refuse to testify, because of coer-
cion or otherwise, from that of an unrepresented class of vic-
tims.' 0 Yet a more liberalized statute represents a danger to
rights of defendants in that it would rob an accused of the right
of cross-examination, and the jury of an acceptable basis on
which to weigh evidence. 67 A system that produces any incen-
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and manner in which he gives his testi-
mony, whether he is worthy of belief."
Libai, supra note 5, at 1025 (citing Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
163. Several commentators have come to this conclusion relying on the case of
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In Pointer, the accused, proceeding pro se at pre-
liminary trial, declined the opportunity to cross-examine a particular witness even
though he had chosen to cross-examine others. When the transcript of the preliminary
hearing was sought to be submitted at trial, in lieu of producing the same witness, the
Supreme Court ruled that introduction of the transcript constituted a violation of the
accused's sixth amendment right insofar as defendant had been denied at preliminary
hearing the representation of counsel and an adequate opportunity to have such counsel
cross-examine.
164. E.g., state statutes codifying the rule: KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, art. 460 § dd
(1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-38 (Supp. 1984); 1982 WASH. LEGIS. SERv. ch.
,129, § 2 (West).
165. These statutes will permit introduction of out-of-court statements only as cor-
roborative evidence if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial.
166. The Testimony of the Child Victim, supra note 28, at 131-32.
167. A more basic flaw inherent in the limited tender years exception is likely to
erupt if a more liberalized form were adopted. The tender years rationale focuses on the
temporal element and the socio-psychological justifications for its suspension. Neutrali-
zation of the time requirement is what separates the tender years exception from res
gestae. In focusing on spontaneity per se, the proposal exalts form over substance. The
temporal element in res gestae serves as a proxy for indicia of reliability and has no
counterpart in the tender years exception. A liberal tender years exception thus repre-
sents impermissible boot-strapping. See Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at
1761. A more acceptable form would be to require some corroborative evidence in the
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tive either to jury bias or to even a narrow class of wrongfully
convicted defendants is just as symptomatic of an anemic form
of justice as one which perpetuates a broad class of unrepre-
sented victims.6 s
As noted earlier, hearsay generally presumes unavailability
except in those few cases, such as the residual exception, where
it is immaterial. The gravitational pull exerted by the hearsay
rule that draws out-of-court statements permissibly into trial oc-
curs when necessity aligns with the absence of alternate sources
for probative evidence.' 69 Necessity, alone, is a powerful compo-
nent of the argument for introduction of a minor's extrajudicial
statements.1
70
Rather than resort to purely theoretical contortions, this re-
liance on legal fictions and hypothetical gymnastics should be
replaced by pragmatic procedural reforms.17 ' Positive results
have been obtained by the use of anatomically correct dolls,
1 2
nature of "sexually abused syndrome" indicators. See supra notes 57, 60-64 and accom-
panying text, in combination with age of the declarant. See also Response to Intra-fam-
ily Sexual Abuse, supra note 2 at 916, n.107.
168. One suggestion has been to subsume a form of tender years exception under the
residual hearsay exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24). The residual exception permits
introduction of statements not qualifying under any other specific rule, but which
evinces equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, are probative on the is-
sue to which they speak, and simultaneously serve the best interests of justice. Propo-
nents of utilizing the residual exception additionally argue that the continuing use of the
res gestae exception is destined to result in a total emasculation of the rule through
successive torturing of the contemporaneity element. See, Evidentiary Theories, supra
note 150, at 158-59.
169. Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1748. One commentator has pro-
posed a "reciprocal sliding scale" whereby reliability and need is measured over proba-
tiveness of the evidence. A high degree of trustworthiness of the evidence and necessity
of its inclusion would lessen the degree of probativeness needed for admission, and at the
same time guard the defendant's right in requiring such high levels of reliability. Com-
ment, supra note 145, at 376.
170. Child Hearsay Statements, supra note 39, at 1752, n.69; Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d
1368, 1372, § 3 (1962) (with infant declarants, the evidence is admitted on the grounds of
necessity); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d at 1203. The court indicated that the real
issue is whether the admissible hearsay statements have a high degree of reliability and
trustworthiness, and a need for the evidence can be demonstrated. Id. at 1203.
171. "About 30 percent of the jurisdictions reported having protocols or guidelines
for interviewing child victims in order to minimize the trauma of the court system upon
the child." Prosecutorial Practices and Policies, supra note 28, at 7.
172. Id. Currently in use in Brooklyn, New York and Hennepin County, Minnesota,
the dolls are used by child witnesses for demonstrational purposes in describing an event
rather than be confronted with questions in connection with actions and functions with
which they have little familiarity.
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special interview rooms for prosecutor's interviews of the vic-
tims,"'3 vertical proceedings,1 7' and partial closure of legal
proceedings.'
7 5
A more crucial system of reforms has been suggested by at
least one commentator with regard to alleviating the tension of
courtroom trauma sufficient to excuse appearance of the victim-
witness while honoring both the necessity of acquiring testimony
for the jury and the defendant's constitutional rights. The pro-
posed scheme consists of "Special Hearings,' ' 7 6 alone, or in con-
junction with testimony taken in a "Child's Courtroom.' 17 7 The
child's courtroom would be designed to induce a more relaxed
state in the witness.'7 8 Actually present would be the judge,
prosecutor, defense counsel, and a child examiner. 7 9 The de-
fendant would view the questioning electronically, out of sight of
the witness.' In addition, the defendant would maintain con-
tact with his counsel by radio and the proceedings would be
transmitted by videotape to the jury.'8 '
Videotaped testimony is uniquely tailored to satisfy the in-
terests of witnesses, defendants and the jury. 82 Under this pro-
posal, the defendant is excluded from the room, but participates
in his defense via transmissions with his counsel. Oath is admin-
istered, cross-examination is conducted in person by defense
173. Id. In Seattle, Washington, an interview/play room with a one-way mirror is
available and prosecutors are provided with special training on how to conduct inter-
views with children.
174. Id. at 8. "Vertical proceedings" coordinate civil, criminal and family actions aris-
ing among the same parties in order to reduce the number of interviews and court ap-
pearances required to be made by a minor victim-witness.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Libai, supra note 5, at 1028-32.
177. Id. at 1016-18.
178. Id. at 1017.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1016. Compare English law, permitting substitution of deposition for live
testimony when medical opinion is presented indicating that production of the witness in
court will involve serious physical or mental impact, Children and Young Persons Act,
1933, 23 Geo. 5., ch. 12, §§ 41-43; and that of Israel, dealing specifically with victims of
sexual abuse under 14, permitting the introduction into evidence the report of a "youth
examiner" who has sole discretion as to the breadth of questioning and the number of
interviews of the victim-witness based on the probability of psychological harm involved,
Law of Evidence Revision (Protection of Children) 5715-1955.
182. Comparatively, it is far superior to any form of hearsay to the extent that it
permits observance of the declarant by the jury in order to adduce demeanor evidence.
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counsel, and the testimony is simultaneously monitored by au-
dio-visual device to the jury, whereby demeanor evidence is ef-
fectively obtained. 183 One court has deemed film testimony a su-
perior form of evidence1 84 inasmuch as defendants are accorded
the right to exercise cross-examination and have the jury weigh
their belief in the testimony, not against the bare record of a
deposition, but under circumstances closely approximating those
available during live production of the witness on the stand."'
The same reasons supporting the videotaping of testimony
for use at trial are available for the filming of "Special Hearings"
prior to trial.' As proposed, the structure of the Special Hear-
ing is analogous to testimony at preliminary hearings, but is ac-
tually more effective. In contrast to a preliminary hearing, the
Special Hearing not only permits full and unlimited cross-exam-
ination, but provides defense counsel, prior to the hearing, with
a complete record of the statements previously given to police,
child examiners, medical personnel and/or the prosecution, as
well as information relating to any and all evidence in the pos-
session of police or the prosecution. '
Like hearsay, substitution by videotape of live testimony
183. See Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses, supra note 58, at 694-95 (citing
Commonwealth v. Stasko, 370 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1977)) (in which the court upheld a convic-
tion for murder over contentions that defendant's right of confrontation was violated by
admission of videotaped deposition in lieu of live testimony. Although the witness was
being treated for severe medical illnesses which prevented her appearance at trial, the
court declined to treat the issue as one concerning "unavailability," finding instead that
the witness was available [on film]).
184. Id. Cf. Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Ques-
tions, 55 ORE. L. REV. 567, 574 (1976), which supports the theory that videotape testi-
mony is not a comparable, but potentially distorted and biased form of live testimony in
the courtroom. But see Attorney General's recommendations in support of videotaping
testimony. ATTY. GEN'S TASK FORCE supra note 8, at 32, 39.
185. Libai, supra note 5, at 1028-32.
186. Libai predicted in 1969 that this system of full disclosure of evidence adverse to
the defendant, in addition to the opportunity for both counsel to accurately assess their
respective cases subsequent to viewing the testimony given at Special Hearing, would
likewise precipitate either (1) a retraction of charges where prosecution felt its case was
too weak to go to trial, or (2) a guilty plea from the defense after review of the case
against it. Id. at 1029-30 n.185. Sixteen years later, the Minneapolis Police Department
has issued a report stating that their two-year program of videotaping preliminary testi-
mony under the guidelines set forth above has resulted in an 80% guilty plea rate. Of the
remaining cases, not a single defendant chose to call the victim to testify and no acquit-
tals were handed down. Videotaping-Device for Fighting Child Abuse, 73 A.B.A. J. 36,
col. 3 (1984).
187. Cf. Commonwealth v. Stasko, supra note 183.
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may often require some foundational equivalent to "unavailabil-
ity"188 prior to its implementation. Unavailability of a witness at
trial may be by reason of death,"' loss of memory, and even
mere refusal to testify. Under these circumstances, courts have
permitted use of hearsay exceptions, when applicable, to vali-
date introduction of prior statements by such witnesses. When
unavailability becomes a prerequisite in cases relating to sexual
abuse of minors, abundant authority exists for the proposition
that a psychological form of unavailability may be asserted, in-
deed, it may be required by public policy."a0
The more crucial legal concern vis-a-vis the child witness of
sexual abuse relates to statutory and policy practices concerning
the crime of incest, and the yet untapped forms of corroboration
relevant to combatting the unduly destructive effect of corrobo-
ration/accomplice"" and other evidentiary restraints on other-
wise justiciable offenses.
Unless promptly reported, sexual abuse visited upon chil-
dren, rarely accompanied by violence and rarely evidenced by
188. The hearsay exception for dying declarations is actually less reliable than the
one sought to be asserted relating to statements of child victims. The rationale is that
faced with their mortality, men do not lie. This assumption finds its basis in religious
beliefs that, while pervasive in the country at the time the common law rule was
adopted, are arguably no longer characteristic of our society. Hearsay statements of chil-
dren undoubtedly carry the same stigma of reliability that is no longer valid given the
results of recent studies. To assume today that dying men speak only the truth and,
concurrently, that children are prone to fabricate explicit sexual assaults upon their per-
son, is anomalous to our notion of a "living law" that tailors itself to the significant
changes in society. See Note, supra note 143, at 748-51.
189. U.S. v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199; accord, U.S. v. Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77. In Nick and
Ironshell, both courts appeared to question whether, given the tender years of the wit-
ness (victims) in issue, adequate cross-examination could in any event be possible. The
courts' decisions seem to support an interpretation of the right as entailing more than
mere witness presence and compulsion to respond under cross. Nick and Ironshell are
susceptible to an interpretation that courts will require a threshold of capacity to re-
spond and a quality of response on the part of the witness, below which potential the
witness may be deemed "not present." Other jurisdictions still require medical testimony
as to the certainty of physical or mental harm before "unavailability" will be presumed.
People v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1972).
190. See, supra note 168-73, 175-81, and accompanying text.
191. The child abuse syndrome is a medically recognized condition characterized by
signs of physical trauma, bone breakage and organ damage which show indications of
healing at various rates, thus significant of spatially and temporally separate injuries,
which could not have been caused in normal activity by children. The child abuse syn-
drome is commonly used as corroborative evidence in child custody and criminal court
actions.
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physical trauma, leaves little legally effective evidence directly
connecting the offender with the offense. This problem is partic-
ularly acute in instances where the lack of physical evidence,
coupled with corroboration/accomplice statutes, critically dilutes
the possibility of prosecutorial action. Often, hearsay exceptions,
which may furnish the avenue for introduction of out of court
statements into a case in chief, are obstructed by a preliminary
requirement of corroborative evidence before non-production of
the witness-victim will be tolerated.
One suggested approach postulated borrows from the "child
abuse" syndrome. 192 As previously noted,198 the sexually abused
child manifests certain uniform symptoms, albeit primarily emo-
tional and behavioral, which, taken together, form a "sexually
abused syndrome."1 94 Suggestion has been made by several au-
thorities that the expert testimony verifying the presence of
such a syndrome be admissible as res ipsa loquitur proof that
such abuse has occurred, or, in the alternative, be admissible to
shift the burden of proof to the defense that the manifestations
are symptomatic of some condition other than sexual abuse of
the subject.9 '
Tangentially relevant to evidentiary issues, but fundamen-
tally related to procedural obstructions, it has been urged by the
U.S. Attorney General that statutes of limitation for the crimi-
nal offenses subsumed under the greater category of "child sex-
ual abuse" be extended to run from the date of disclosure by the
victim.' 6e Otherwise offenders, acting upon parental or guardian-
ship dominion, would be able to insulate themselves from pun-
ishment by intimidating victims into silence until such time as
legal proceedings are time-barred.
Four states have decriminalized incest, retaining only the
blood-marriage prohibition.19 7 While those states still retain
192. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
194. Lloyd, Corroboration, supra note 19, at 109-10; S. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental
Sexual Abuse of Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Tool for Families, in LEGAL REP-
RESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD, 70, 82 (National Association Counsel for Chil-
dren 1979); INTRAFAMILY CHILD ABUSE CASES, supra note 3, at 40-41.
195. Arry. GEN'S TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 103.
196. Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio and Vermont.
197. E.g., states such as Arkansas, with statutes protecting minors up to the age of 14
from "sexual contact," would be unavailing to the 15-year old victim of incest.
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child sexual abuse and/or carnal knowledge statutes, there are
age differentials among the states, which create, in some in-
stances, faults in the cloak of legal protection which expose chil-
dren to incestuous abuse with impunity.198
Of all cases of physical and sexual abuse reported to child
protective agencies nationwide, less than 5% of the substanti-
ated cases are pursued in criminal actions.199 While this figure is
not representative of only sexual abuse or incest cases, those of-
fenses are included in the calculation. In any event, the figures
for criminal prosecution evince a serious discrepancy between
sanctions for the same crime depending on whether or not the
offender is related to the victim. "The legal response to family
violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive
act, not the relationship between the victim and the abuser.
' 200
At present the nature of incest impedes prosecution to the ex-
tent that prosecutors feel that such crimes are evidentially un-
manageable. The recent exposure of the gravity of the problem
has yet to produce remedial modifications to a judicial system in
which intrafamily crimes are largely untouched and historical
taboos prevent legal intervention.
However, a sweeping reform which merely criminalizes in-
cest is not wholly adequate. Creative sentencing must be em-
ployed in order that the offender be punished and yet still be
called upon to compensate and stabilize the remaining family
members.2 0 ' A further recommendation urges restitution to the
victim by the offender for treatment and tort damages. 202 More-
198. Besharov, Child Protection, supra note 4, at 159-60. While this figure is not
representative of only sexual abuse or incest cases, those offenses are included in the
calculation. In any event, the figures for criminal prosecution evince a serious discrep-
ancy between sanction of the same crime dependent on whether the offender is related to
the victim.
199. ATTy. GEN's TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 4.
200. The U.S. Attorney General's recommendations for sentencing include weekend
and evening incarceration that permits the offender to work and render financial support
to his family. Id. A derivative repercussion of this form of sanction is that the acquies-
cent role generally assumed by mothers in incest families, see supra notes 32, 47-48 and
accompanying text, would be tempered by the hope of financial security in conjunction
with punishment of the offender.
201. Id. See generally Tort Remedies, supra note 31.
202. Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation, supra note 2, at 142-44 (citing Institute of
Judicial Administration/ABA, Juvenile Justice Standards Projects, "Standards Relating
to Abuse and Neglect - Tentative Draft" (New York: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1977) and
Urzi, "Cooperative Approaches to Child Protection, A Community Guide" (Minnesota
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over, adequate reform must be prefaced by widespread recogni-
tion of incest as a serious crime well within the parens patriae
role of the state to police.210
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues confronted in a legal analysis of child sexual
abuse do not lend themselves to scrutiny in a purely legal con-
text. The status of current law, and its frequent inability to de-
vise adequate responses to the underrepresentation of child vic-
tims, is the product of time-honored misconceptions and judicial
presumptions having no basis in science, psychology, sociology
or fact. Education of the public, legislatures, and the judiciary is
required to dispel irrational notions and their effect on a legal
system designed so that no class be disadvantaged in seeking
protection of the law. Adequate, just and compassionate reform
can only be undertaken when it is recognized that innovations in
criminal prosecution arising from child abuse are not asserted to
award special treatment, but merely to attain the legal balance
that is the entitlement of all citizens, and effect the special solic-
itude that is the system's obligation to children.
Demetra John McBride
Dept. of Public Welfare)).
203. At least one legal commentator has urged legal and judicial restraint from inter-
vention in incest cases. Wald, Neglected Children, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1026-27 (1975).
This article claims that since the effects of sexual abuse do not immediately manifest
themselves, id. at 1025, and are, in any event, "usually emotional," id., the trauma
caused by involvement of the legal system may outweigh that caused by "parental be-
havior." Id. Further, the author states that the term "abuse" may be inappropriate be-
cause he believes that such conduct may not always be harmful. Id. at 1024, n.203. This
precise minimization of the nature of incest, the apprehension to term it "abuse" and the
preference toward deeming it "parental behavior" are the philosophical evils sought to
be avoided.
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